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Abstract
We propose a simple classroom experiment on speculative bubbles: the Bubble
Game. This game is useful to discuss about market efficiency and trading strategies in
a financial economics course, and about behavioral aspects in a game theory course,
at all levels. The Bubble Game can be played with any number of students, as long as
this number is strictly greater than one. Students sequentially trade an asset which is
publicly known to have a fundamental value of zero. If there is no cap on asset prices,
speculative bubbles can arise at the Nash equilibrium because no trader is ever sure to
be last in the market sequence. Otherwise, the Nash equilibrium involves no trade.
Bubbles usually occur with or without a cap on prices. Traders who are less likely to
be last and have less steps of reasoning to perform to reach equilibrium are in general
more likely to speculate.
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JEL codes: A20, G1, D7
31. INTRODUCTION
Financial markets are often viewed as going through speculative bubbles and crashes.
Shiller (2000), for example, emphasizes irrational exuberance as a driver of booms
and bursts. History, with the South Sea bubble or the Mississippi bubble, and more
recent episodes such as the dot-com bubble suggest that these events are not rare.
However, to the extent that fundamental values are not observed ex-ante in the field, it
is very difficult to empirically identify speculative bubbles. Any price sequence can
be rationalized ex-post by changes in beliefs or risk aversion. To overcome this
difficulty and study bubble phenomena, economists have relied on the experimental
methodology: in an experiment, fundamental values are controlled by the
experimenter and can thus be compared to asset prices.
We propose a classroom game on speculative bubbles, the Bubble Game, that is
derived from Moinas and Pouget (2013). The Bubble Game can be fruitfully used for
all class levels in the context of financial economics courses on asset pricing,
investments, corporate finance, behavioral finance, or trading. It indeed enables to
discuss topics such as market efficiency, speculative bubbles, and investment
strategies.
The Bubble Game can also be used in game theory courses. It proposes an interesting
setup in which one can solve for a Nash equilibrium in which all players rationally
speculate (as is shown below, this is the case when there is no cap on transaction
prices). This paradoxical result is a reminiscence of the envelop paradox discussed by
Nalebuff (1989) and, especially, Geanakoplos (1992). The Bubble Game can also be
useful to apply various concepts of behavioral game theory (see, for example,
Camerer 2003) in a simple yet relevant economic context. When there is a cap on
transaction prices, behavioral game theory fits the data better than traditional game
4theory because it incorporates investors’ bounded rationality.
The Bubble Game features a valueless financial asset that can be traded in a
sequential market. Traders are ex-ante equally likely to be in each position in the
market sequence. Traders have the choice between buying or not buying at the
proposed price. If a trader declines the offer, the game ends and the current owner is
stuck with the asset. If a trader buys and is able to resell, he makes a profit. The game
can be played with any number of students. We focus here on the case illustrated in
Figure 1 in which there are three traders in each market (there can be several markets
at the same time in the same classroom).
INSERT FIGURE 1
Prices are exogenous. The first trader is offered a price 10n, where n is random and
follows a geometric distribution: the first price is 1 with probability 12 , 10 with
probability 14 , 100 with probability
1
8 , etc. If a trader decides to buy, he proposes to
resell at a price that is 10 times higher than the price at which he bought.1
Students are endowed with 1 unit of the Experimental Currency Unit (ECU).
Additional capital may be required so as to buy the asset at price P> 1. This
additional capital (that is, P−1) is provided by an outside financier. The instructor
plays the role of the outside financier for all players. Payoffs are divided between the
trader and the financier in proportion to the capital initially invested: a fraction 1P for
the trader and a fraction P−1P for the financier.
Consider a trader who decides to buy the asset at price P. When he is unable to resell,
his final wealth is 0, which corresponds to the fundamental value of the asset. The
outside financier also ends up with a zero final wealth, i.e., he loses P−1 that he
invested to finance the purchase of the asset. When the trader is able to resell the
asset, he gets 1P percent of the proceed, that is, 10×P, and thus ends up with a final
wealth of 10. The outside financier ends up with 10×P−10. The game has thus
5three potential outcomes for a trader: 1 if the trader refuses to buy, 10 if the trader
buys and is able to resell, and 0 if he buys but cannot resell (either because he is last
or because the next trader refuses to buy).
When there is no cap on the first price, no trader is ever sure to be last in the market
sequence despite prices revealing some information regarding traders’ position.
Bubbles can arise at the Nash equilibrium. If all traders anticipate that others buy the
asset, his or her best response is to also buy the asset if he is not too risk averse. In a
market with three students, Bayes’ rule indicates that the probability to be last is zero
conditional on observing a price P= 1 or P= 10, and constant at 47 conditional on
P≥ 100. If a trader buys the asset and anticipates that others also do so, either he is
sure to resell or he has three chances out of seven to be able to resell and to earn a
return that is tenfold larger than the amount invested.
In contrast, when there is a price cap, only irrational bubbles can form: at
equilibrium, there is no bubble because all traders refuse to buy. To show this, we
cannot rely on backward induction. Indeed, in a given realization of n, the price cap
might not be reached. For example, if the cap on the first price is set at 100 and a
player sees a price of 1, he knows that no player in his group will see the maximum
price of 10,000 (he knows they will see prices of 10 and 100) and thus no player in
his group will know with certainty that he is last. With this particular realization of n,
backward induction cannot start.
An infection argument a` la Morris and Shin (1995) applies though. Consider again
that the cap on the first price is set at 100. The information sets of traders in this case
are represented in Figure 2. This figure shows that there are three potential games that
can be played depending on the price that is proposed to the first trader: Game 1 is
played if the first price is 1, Game 2 if it is 10, and Game 3 if it is 100. The reasoning
for the infection argument goes backward. Whatever the price they are proposed,
6traders, if they are rational and if rationality is common knowledge, anticipate the
following behavior from traders at the various positions in the market sequence.
The trader who would be proposed the highest possible price of 10,000 would be sure
to be last. It would thus be a dominant strategy for him to refuse to buy. The trader
who would receive the second highest price of 1,000 would not know whether he is
penultimate or last in the trading sequence. However, in both cases, he would not
want to buy: even if he were penultimate, he would anticipate that the subsequent
trader would know he is last and would refuse to trade. Thus, whatever his position in
the market sequence, the trader who is proposed a price of 1,000 would not be able to
resell after buying. As a result, he would be better off not buying.
Consider now the trader who would be proposed a price of 100 and who could thus be
first, second or third in the market sequence. If he were last, he would not want to
buy. If he were first or second in the market sequence, he would anticipate that the
next trader at a price of 1,000 would refuse to trade and thus he would also refuse to
trade. Likewise, the trader who would be proposed a price of 10 could be first or
second in the market sequence and anticipates that the subsequent trader at a price of
100 refuses to trade. He is thus better off not buying. Finally, the same logic applies
to the trader who would receive a price of 1: even if he is sure to be first in the market
sequence, he is better off not buying because he anticipates that the subsequent trader
at a price of 10 refuses to trade.
Overall, even if the price offered to the first trader is 1 and thus if no trader in the
game can be sure that he is last, there is no bubble at equilibrium when there is a finite
cap on the price of the asset.
INSERT FIGURE 2
The Bubble Game complements the asset market classroom games proposed by Ball
and Holt (1998) and Bostian and Holt (2009) based on Smith, Suchanek, and
7Williams (1988) (see also Holt 2007). The contributions of the Bubble Game
compared to these classroom games are fourfold. First, the Bubble Game is simple
enough to allow theoretical predictions for individual speculative behavior. One
reason for this is that our experimental design enables one to control for the number
of trading opportunities (it does not feature continuous trading, for example). This
eases the interpretation of the experimental data gathered in the classroom. Second,
the Bubble Game does not involve fundamental risk and thus bubbles can be defined:
even if some subjects are risk-lovers, we can unambiguously identify bubbles. Third,
the Bubble Game can offer the opportunity to observe and discuss rational bubbles.
The last contribution is more practical. The Bubble Game does not require any team
to register transactions, compute profits and losses, or prepare document for the
debriefing, nor does it require the use of internet. It is thus much simpler and faster to
implement.
2. PROCEDURE
Pre-printed decision sheets and envelopes can be used to collect the students’
decisions quickly and privately. The game itself lasts around fifteen minutes.
Including the presentation of the game and the discussion of the results, the game
session can fit in a one hour and fifteen minute class. The game can also occupy a two
hours and a half class session if one extends the discussion to include examples from
actual markets and behavioral issues (see below in the discussion section for
suggestions).
In general, the authors implement, in their class, the Bubble Game with a cap on the
first price at 10,000. The Nash equilibrium predicts that there is no bubble but, in
general, a lot of speculative trades are observed. Also, in this case, it is very unlikely
8that any student actually receives the maximum price of 1,000,000 and thus students
who speculated can always claim (if they did not receive the maximum price) that
they were betting on the next trader in the market sequence buying the asset. As we
show below, such behavior can be quite rational given the data that we have already
collected.
ADVANCE PREPARATION - The advance preparation consists in making copies of
the instructions (provided in the Appendix), and preparing the decision sheets
(potentially by using the simple excel spreadsheet we provide as supplemental
material).
THE INSTRUCTIONS - The instructions fit on the front and back sides of a single
sheet of paper. A questionnaire can also be distributed in class after reading the
instructions. The questionnaire enables the instructor to check that the rules of the
game are well understood, and to possibly re-explain them on a face-to-face basis. A
powerpoint presentation of the instructions and a word version of the questionnaire
are provided as supplemental material.
THE DECISION SHEETS - The instructor randomly assigns students to a
three-person group (a market) and to a position in the sequence of offers in this
market (that is, first, second or third with probability 13 ). The instructor also randomly
draws the first price in each market.
The first price is 10n, where n is random and follows a geometric distribution:
P(n= i) = 12
i+1
, that is, the first price is 1 with probability 12 , 10 with probability
1
4 ,
100 with probability 18 , etc. If there is a cap K on the first price, then
P(n= K) = 1−∑K−1i=0 12
i+1
. The excel spreadsheet provided as supplemental material
enables to easily draw the first price and the market positions, and thus to determine
in advance the price that will be proposed to all participants.
For each market and each of the three students, the instructor writes down on the
9decision sheet the price that is or would be proposed to the student. The instructor
then slips each decision sheet in an envelop. In the classroom, the instructor shuffles
and distributes the envelops. If the number of students is not a multiple of three, the
remaining one or two students can team up with some classmates. Students are
encouraged to remember or write down their ID number to retrieve their profits when
they are displayed by the instructor.
THE GAME - The Bubble Game is designed as a one-shot simultaneous game.
Decision sheets are filled by students simultaneously. This prevents students from
inferring information on their position based on sequential participation. Students
therefore take their decisions conditional on a price being proposed. Their decision
however only matters for computing their profits if they are first, or if all the previous
students have decided to buy.
THE OUTCOME - The instructor collects the decision sheets and records the
decisions of each student by ID number in the excel spreadsheet. For a classroom of
thirty students, this does not take more than a couple of minutes and could be done
during a break. Profits and graphs are automatically computed and drawn in the excel
spreadsheet. This enables the instructor to open the floor for discussion right after the
experiment.
INCENTIVES - The authors have run the Bubble Game several times in their
classroom and have often used some kind of incentives to spice up the game. For
example, at the London Business School, students in the MBA program received one
box of chocolate per experimental currency unit (a student could thus end up with 0,
1, or 10 boxes of chocolate). At Princeton University, two students among the
undergraduate and graduate students who participated in the classroom game were
randomly drawn to receive an amazon.com $10-coupon per experimental currency
unit (these students could thus end up with $0, $10 or $100 worth of coupons).
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3. DISCUSSION
The typical results one obtains when organizing the Bubble Game in the classroom
are represented in Figure 3. First, bubbles in general arise whether or not there is a cap
on prices. Bubbles thus form even if they would be ruled out by backward induction.
These typical results suggest that some people are making mistakes, in particular
some participants who buy at the maximum potential price. Trading mistakes have
been documented in actual financial markets by various papers. Two cases in which
they are pretty clear are offered by Rashes (2001) regarding stock ticker confusion
between MCI and MCIC, and by Xiong and Yu (2011) regarding Chinese warrants
trades at prices higher than the maximum potential payoff.
Second, the propensity for a subject to enter a bubble in general increases with the
distance between the offered price and the maximum price. We refer to this
phenomenon as a snowball effect, and show in Moinas and Pouget (2013) that it is
related to a higher probability not to be last and to a higher number of steps of iterated
reasoning.
This snowball effect suggests that some participants are actually betting on the fact
that others may make mistakes. If one believes that there is a positive probability that
a trader will make a mistake and buy the asset at too high a price or that a trader
believes other may make mistakes, it may become rational to speculate and ride the
bubble. Such a rational speculative trading is consistent with hedge funds’ behavior
during the dot-com bubble, as documented by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), and
with London-based bank Hoare’s trading behavior during the 1720’s South Sea
bubble, as reported by Temin and Voth (2003).
INSERT FIGURE 3
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4. LINK WITH BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY
Different explanations based on various generalizations of Nash equilibrium can be
put forward to explain these results but we focus here on the simplest one based on
Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).2 This
equilibrium concept postulates that players do not always choose what is best for
them but choose what is better more often. Their payoff responsiveness is not infinite
as is the case in the Nash equilibrium but is instead limited. Moreover, players
understand that others have a limited payoff responsiveness. This equilibrium concept
may thus be viewed as a way to model strategic uncertainty, i.e., a situation in which
players are not sure about others’ behavior.
Because the Bubble Game requires longer and longer chains of belief formation when
a player is farther away from the maximum potential price, one could expect QRE to
be relevant. To see this, consider that players are risk neutral and have the same
payoff responsiveness λ . For simplicity, we focus on the case in which the first price
is capped at 1. Let’s compute the probability to buy if players use quantal responses
instead of best responses. The player who received a price of 100 is last with
probability 1. If he buys, he gets a payoff of 0. If he does not buy, his payoff is 1. For
him, the probability to buy is thus:
P(Buy|Price= 100) = e
λ×0
eλ×0 + eλ×1
=
1
1+ eλ
. (1)
A player who is proposed to buy at a price of 10 is sure to be second in the market
sequence. Moreover, he anticipates that the last player buys with the probability
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computed above. His expected profit if he buys is thus 1
1+eλ
10, i.e., he gets 10 if the
last player decides to buy, otherwise he gets 0. The probability to buy of the second
player is thus:
P(Buy|Price= 10) = e
λP(Buy|Price=100)×10
eλP(Buy|Price=100)×10 + eλ
=
1
1+ e
λ (1− 1
1+eλ
10)
, (2)
which is larger than P(Buy|Price= 100).
Finally, the player who is proposed to buy at a price of 1 is sure to be first in the
market sequence. He anticipates that the second player buys with the probability
P(Buy|Price= 10), computed above. His probability to buy is thus:
P(Buy|Price= 1) = e
λP(Buy|Price=10)×10
eλP(Buy|Price=10)×10 + eλ
=
1
1+ e
λ
1− 1
1+e
λ (1− 1
1+eλ
10)
10
 , (3)
which is larger than P(Buy|Price= 10).
Notice that when λ goes to infinity, the traders are perfectly rational and the
probability to buy at each of the three prices of 1, 10, and 100, converges to zero,
which is the Nash equilibrium.
As an example, consider that the payoff responsiveness, λ , equals 0.3 (which is in
fact the value of λ that enables the QRE to best fit the data in Moinas and Pouget
(2013) according to the maximum likelihood criteria). In this case, the probability to
buy is 43% for the third player, 73% for the second player, and 87% for the first
player. These probabilities to buy fit Moinas and Pouget (2013)’s data much better
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than the Nash equilibrium. They also show that QRE can display a snowball effect: it
becomes less and less costly to buy the overvalued asset when a trader is further away
from the maximum price.
For the cases in which the cap is higher than one, the predictions of the QRE can be
computed similarly by taking into account the probability to be first, second or third
conditional on the price being proposed. The predicted probabilities to buy of the
QRE with λ = 0.3 for all the cases considered in Moinas and Pouget (2013) (cap at 1,
cap at 100, cap at 1,000, and no cap) are illustrated in Figure 4. The excel file
provided in the supplemental material enables to automatically estimate the value of λ
by maximum likelihood, and to draw a figure similar to one of the panels in Figure 4.
INSERT FIGURE 4
5. CONCLUSION
The Bubble Game is a very simple classroom experiment that enables to observe
speculation decisions at various phases of a speculative episode. It shows that market
efficiency, defined as the price of a financial asset being equal to its fundamental
value, can be dramatically dampened by speculative bubbles. Also, it may be helpful
to demonstrate that speculative bubbles can form even if they are based on a very
small probability that some traders may make a mistake.
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NOTES
1These features (exogenous and random prices, trading sequences, limited number of traders) are
useful to set up a practically simple but conceptually rich game. They should not be taken literally.
They are best viewed as a metaphor of actual financial markets in which one can trade at several points
in time and, when surfing a bubble, wonders whether he is more likely to be at the beginning or at the
end of the speculative episode. Our experience with organizing and analyzing the game in the classroom
is that students who participated in the game can feel the close link between the game and trading in a
bubbly financial market. The Bubble Game is in fact very close to the metaphor used by Chuck Prince,
former CEO of Citigroup, to describe the behavior of his institution during the buy-out boom in 2007:
“When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is
playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing” (Financial Times, July, 9th, 2007). Our
game is in the spirit of the musical chairs: there are three players but only two can end up with a profit
when the game ends: the last one to buy (or to sit as in the musical chairs) ends up with a loss.
2Moinas and Pouget (2013) discuss and estimate additional models that can explain the data. On the
one hand, because the Bubble Game involves introspective and iterated reasoning, one could think of
the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004). This model considers that players
underestimate other agents’ sophistication. On the other hand, it might be difficult to form beliefs
about the likelihood of reselling at each possible transaction price. Instead, players might simplify the
problem by assuming that this likelihood is the same across various transaction prices. The analogy-
based expectation equilibrium of Jehiel (2005) could thus be pertinent. Moinas and Pouget (2013)
theoretically show that each of these models as well as the QRE can account for the main stylized facts
from the experiment, namely, (i) the existence of bubbles even when there is a price cap, and (ii) the
presence of a snowball effect.
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6. FIGURES
Figure 1: Timing of the Bubble Game with three players.
The Bubble Game features a sequential market. Question marks emphasize the fact that traders are
ex-ante equally likely to be first, second or third, and to be offered to buy at prices P1, P2, or P3,
respectively. This figure displays traders’ payoff only. In case of successful speculation, the payoff
is 10 because prices are set as powers of 10 and traders invest one unit of capital with limited liability.
Outside financiers’ payoffs are omitted.
Figure 2: Potential games when the cap on the first price is 100.
This figure shows the three potential games that traders might be playing depending on the price
that is proposed to the first trader in the market sequence when the cap on the first price is 100.
Game 1 occurs if the first price is 1, i.e., if the price offered to the first trader in the trading sequence
is 1; Game 2 if the first price is 10; Game 3 if the first price is 100. The oval sets indicate the
information known to the traders who are proposed the various prices. For example, the trader who
receives a price of 100 may be playing Game 1 (and be last in the trading sequence), Game 2 (and
be penultimate), or Game 3 (and be second-to-last). Notice that a trader who is proposed a price of
1 is sure to be playing Game 1 and thus to be first in the trading sequence. Also, a trader who is
proposed a price of 10,000 is sure to be playing Game 3 and thus to be last.
Figure 3: Data from previous sessions.
Data from the experiments reported in Moinas and Pouget (2013) on the probability of a Buy deci-
sion, depending on the initial price, the probability not to be last and the number of steps of iterated
reasoning. The numbers in the bars indicate the number of players that have been proposed the
corresponding price. The excel spreadsheet provided as supplemental material is designed to auto-
matically generate these graphs with the data of the classroom game.
Figure 4: Probability to buy of the QRE with λ = 0.3.
Predicted probability to buy of the QRE with λ = 0.3 for the cases in which the cap on the first price
is at 1, 100, 1,000, and infinity. The data is taken from Moinas and Pouget (2013).
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7. APPENDIX
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CASE WHERE K = 10,000
Welcome to this market game. Please read carefully the following instructions. They are identical for
all participants. Please do not communicate with the other participants, stay quiet, and turn off your
mobile phone during the game. If you have questions, please raise your hand. An instructor will come
and answer.
As an appreciation for your presence today, you receive a participation fee of 5 euros. In addition to
this amount, you can earn money during the game. The game will last approximately half an hour,
including the reading of the instructions.
EXCHANGE PROCESS
To play this game, we form groups of three players. Each player is endowed with one euro which can
be used to buy an asset. Your task during the game is thus to choose whether you want to buy or not
the asset. This asset does not generate any dividend. If the asset price exceeds one euro, you can still
buy the asset. We indeed consider that a financial partner (who is not part of the game) provides you
with the additional capital and shares profits with you according to the respective capital invested. The
market proceeds sequentially. The first player is proposed to buy at a price P1. If he buys, he proposes
to sell the asset to the second player at a price which is ten times higher, P2 = 10×P1. If the second
player accepts to buy, the first player ends up the game with 10 euros. The second player then proposes
to sell the asset to the third trader at a price P3 = 10×P2 = 100×P1. If the third player buys the asset,
the second player ends up the game with 10 euros. The third player does not find anybody to whom he
can sell the asset. Since this asset does not generate any dividend, he ends up the game with 0 euro.
This game is summarized in the following figure.
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Buy
Buy Buy
Buy Buy
Buy
P1 P2 P3
(10,10,0)
(1,1,1) (0,1,1) (10,0,1)
At the beginning of the game, players do not know their position in the market sequence. Positions are
randomly determined with one chance out of three for each player to be first, second or third.
PROPOSED PRICES
The price P1 that is proposed to the first player is random. This price is a power of 10 and is
determined as follows:
Price P1 Probability that this price is realized
1 1/2 (50%)
10 1/4 (25%)
100 1/8 (12.5%)
1,000 1/16 (6.3%)
10,000 1/16 (6.3%)
Players decisions are made simultaneously and privately. For example, if the first price P1 = 1 has been
drawn, the prices that are simultaneously proposed to the three players are: P1 = 1 for the first player,
P2 = 10 for the second player, and P3 = 100 for the third player. Identically, if the first price
P1 = 10,000 has been drawn, the prices that are simultaneously proposed to the three players are:
P1 = 10,000 for the first player, P2 = 100,000 for the second player, and P3 = 1,000,000 for the third
player.
The prices that you are been proposed can give you the following information regarding your position
in the market sequence:
- if you are proposed to buy at a price of 1, you are sure to be first;
- if you are proposed to buy at a price of 10, you have one chance out of three to be first and two
chances out of three to be second in the market sequence;
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- if you are proposed to buy at a price of 100 or 1,000, you have one chance out of seven to be first, two
chances out of seven to be second, and four chances out seven to be last in the market sequence;
- if you are proposed to buy at a price of 10,000, you have one chance out of four to be first, one
chance out of four to be second, and two chances out four to be last.
- if you are proposed to buy at a price of 100,000, you have one chance out of two to be second, and
one chance out of two to be third.
- if you are proposed to buy at a price of 1,000,000, you are sure to be last.
In order to preserve anonymity, a number will be assigned to each player. Once decision will be made,
we will tell you (anonymously) the group to which you belong, your position in the market sequence,
if you are proposed to buy, and your final gain.
Do you have any question?
